Industrial Security

Vol. 3, No. 4

OCTOBER, 1959

"SECURITY IN THE OLDEN DAYS"

OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE
American Society for Industrial Security

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SEA-LAB

This huge antenna is part of an electronic and optical system that RCA installed and is operating on the S.S. American Mariner. The purpose of the equipment, for which the ship has been refitted, is to provide the most precise data yet obtained at sea on missile flights over a range extending from Cape Canaveral, Fla., to the area of Ascension Island. The project is sponsored jointly by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense and the Army Ordnance Command. A scientific staff—most of them RCA personnel—will operate the equipment and report on missile performance from descent from space to final plunge, the data to be shared by all branches of the armed services.

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Industrial Security

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IN THIS ISSUE

"Industrial Security" is published quarterly by the American Society for Industrial Security, 431 Investment Building, Washington 5, D. C. Printed in U. S. A. Second-class postage paid at Washington, D. C. Additional entry at Baltimore, Maryland. Subscription price $4.00 per year, domestic and foreign.

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One is choice, the other isn't.

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The violin on the left is an 18th century German instrument, valued at $50.00.

WHAT WE MUST KNOW ABOUT COMMUNISM

By RICHARD HALL

• The strangest, most puzzling force in all history has entered our world. Starting in Russia in 1917, it has in just over 40 years taken control of one-third of the world's people and one-fourth its territory. How has this amazing development happened? What is the nature of this new force which has seemed to come from nowhere and reach everywhere?

For decades we Americans have looked away from the painful facts about Communiism and satisfied ourselves with the half-truths and evasions that make life more pleasant. We have been drifting, emotionally and mentally, until we have reached a state that can only be called *unreadiness*. This unreadiness is true of almost all of us.

The time has come when Communism's many successes make it vital that we study the subject. We must understand the theories of Marx and Lenin that form its basis. We must also learn to recognize Communism's tactics and methods, including its plans for world expansion. And perhaps most important, we must know what values in our own way of life stand opposed to Communism.

The answers may not make us happy, nor will they be final. But we can assume that in most important ways, they will be with us for a long, long time.

The Theory Behind the System

By the middle of the last century, capitalism had brought the production of goods to the point where, for the first time in history, a decent standard of living for all seemed possible. Although wages and working conditions were poor, working people had a new feeling of dignity. They were not serfs and slaves as in earlier centuries. They were men, with rights of their own, looking forward to a better future.

But, as with all great developments, progress was slow. Most of the employe "fringe benefits" we take for granted today had hardly been dreamed of. The new machines could produce goods in quantity, yes, but the benefits of this new production were still limited and not widespread. It was only logical that some sincere people would look around for another system, entirely different from capitalism, that would deliver the benefits of the machine to everyone, and without delay.

Enter Karl Marx, a German philosopher. He had a theory, in violent contrast to the ideas of capitalism and free enterprise, which he claimed would end all injustice to the working people. It is his theory, based on the kind of capitalism he saw around him in the mid-19th century, which has become the foundation of the Soviet economy.

Marx divided society into two halves: those who

Adapted from *What We Must Know About Communism*
by Harry and Bonaro Overstreet
published by W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.

owned the means of production (factories, machines, land) and those who *did the work*. He believed that as countries became more and more industrialized, this division or "class system" would become more definite. The "few" owners would dictate harsher and harsher terms to the "many" workers. For the sake of profits, they would cut wages to near-starvation level. Exploitation of the most vicious kind would make the poor even poorer and the rich, richer.

But this could not go on forever, said Marx. Eventually, he predicted, the workers would rise in revolt against the owners and seize all the factories, machines and land. When this day came, a new order would be established. All the old injustices would disappear and a truly "classless" society would be born. The government, which Marx believed was the tool of the "owning" class, would no longer be necessary. After the new system was in good working order, the government would just wither away, because under this perfect system, things would run themselves.

Marx claimed his system was "scientific"—based on the careful examination of the facts of history and the logical projection of these facts into the future. He published his theories before even looking for proof.

For example, when he went to England, expecting to find the workers ready for revolution, he found instead that they wanted reforms *within the existing system*. They were working toward changes in the laws, and formation of unions and trade associations. The English were not willing to scrap their capitalist system altogether, simply because it was not yet polished and perfect. But at this point in his career, Marx did not think his theories over. Judging by the record, he turned his back on the English workers and found a German group with a greater respect for theory.

It may seem strange that men in Russia who were to seize power in 1917 should have adopted the contradictory and vague theories of a German philosopher who had lived a half-century before. It may seem even stranger that today's Soviet leaders should cling to them when they can see the successes chalked up by modern capitalism in America and western Europe.

But the fact is that when they took over Marx's "science" *they equipped themselves with the strongest weapon ever created for building and maintaining a dictatorship*. Look at the advantages of operating a country on the basis of an iron-clad theory which no-one is allowed to contradict:

First, it binds world Communism together, with a single set of ideas and rules. Since Marx prophesied that revolution must come to every capitalist country, Communists can band together to stir up ill-will and unrest elsewhere.

Second, since Marx claimed his theories were absolutely and eternally true—in fact, infallible—every Communist can have a useful sense of superiority. The comrade who "knows" that history is on his side can despise men in capitalist countries who he thinks are living on borrowed time only. He is above criticism, no matter what kind of activity he stoops to.

Thirdly, Marx's infallible theory tells Communists what to see in every situation. Thus, the USSR was able to announce "conclusively"—without weighing the evidence—that the Hungarian revolt was the work of Western imperialists, even though the UN Committee investigating it reported differently.

And finally, Marx's wonderfully simple and "sure" theories attract many dissatisfied, idealistic people in non-Communist countries who are looking for a sure and simple explanation of life, or a cause which will be an outlet for their dreams and energies.

It would be hard to find anything quite as useful as an "infallible" and "scientific" theory like this to give Communism appeal, flexibility and power.

In Contrast: The Western Way

What we call our Western way is not so neat a product as the "science" of Marx and Lenin (the Russian revolutionary leader who became premier in 1918). It depends on very different ideas: on the great Christian and Jewish religions, on Greek love for learning, on Roman and British law, to name a few. But it is a richer product than Marxism because it has been *grown into*. It gives us room to move because it is not as rigid as a single theory. Our Constitution is symbolic of it: with all our differences, we can live under it, use it to decide new questions, and grow with it.

Communists seem so sure of themselves when they talk about their ideas that sometimes we think they are stronger than we are. But the fact is that when they set aside the great Western ideas, they lost their roots in our human past. When they want a guide, they cannot turn to Jesus, or Socrates or St. Paul, Luther, Shakespeare, Jefferson or Lincoln. They have only *Marx and Lenin*. This is their weakness and our strength.

For instance, when the agreement on cultural exchanges between this country and the USSR was being worked out in 1957-58, it was they who refused to swap ideas and people in politics and philosophy. They wanted to exchange only in matters of science and agriculture.

From Communist Theories, Communist Action

In the flood of words that fill the newspapers,

magazines and airwaves, a basic fact of Communism, stemming straight from Marx's theories, is often overlooked. It is that Marx and Lenin, dividing the world into two halves—the capitalist and Communist—believe in "permanent revolution." They believe that there is no true peace possible between the two halves. Marx wrote in 1850: "It is our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent." In 1920, Lenin wrote, "Our cause . . . is the world proletarian revolution, the cause of creating a world-wide Soviet Republic." And in 1921: "The epoch of bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism has come to a close. A new chapter in world history . . . has opened."

Since Khrushchev is now staging a well-publicized "return to Lenin," we would do well to understand just what Lenin's ideas were. Khrushchev keeps presenting Lenin as a believer in "peaceful co-existence." But Lenin made his own position on war, peace and "permanent revolution" perfectly clear. In 1919 he wrote, ". . . the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end." Peace, as Lenin saw it, was a "respite for another war" while the permanent revolution went on. ". . . There is no other alternative: either the Soviet Government triumphs in every advanced country in the world or the most reactionary imperialism triumphs . . . Anglo-American imperialism . . ."

This does not sound like Khrushchev's "peaceful co-existence." Nor is it. Because in his Report to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in February 1956, when he launched his "peace campaign," Khrushchev *also* made it clear that if force were necessary to fulfill Communism's "historic mission," then force would be used. "There is no doubt," he said, "that in a number of capitalist countries the violent overthrow of the (government) and the sharp aggravation of class struggle . . . are inevitable."

So it is clear how Marx's rigid theories lend themselves to the cause of world expansion by the Communists: by dividing men into bitterly separate economic classes, and then dividing the world into those who practice Communism as a "solution" and those who do not, they create a splendid excuse for Communist conquest. The fact that they often call this conquest "liberation," and war "peace," does not change the fact that they have killed millions of human beings, exploited millions more in slave-labor camps and brought 900 million under control of an absolute dictatorship.

How has the Soviet managed to expand its territory until it now includes one-fourth of the world's land? Several kinds of imperialism, each suited to

particular situations, have been used—sometimes singly, sometimes together. Let us look at these in detail:

The first might be called old-line imperialism: simply taking over countries by force. In 1940, the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were added to Russia. Stalin scarcely bothered to find a theory to cover this theft.

As a second method, the Soviet has practiced puppet-government control. By this method it has "liberated" into slavery Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. East Germany also has a puppet government, as well as the "people's republics" of Outer Mongolia, North Korea and Vietminh.

The Soviet has also extended its empire through the Communist parties in non-Communist countries. According to the October, 1957 *Kommunist*, official newspaper of the Party in the Soviet, there are now 62 such parties, including 18 in Europe, 20 in Latin America and one each in the U. S. and Canada. It is important to remember that the many devoted members of these Parties do not belong, in their hearts, to their native country. They owe their first duty to the Soviet, doing whatever the Party says comes next on the program of the world Communist movement.

Another tactic for extending the empire has also been in the way of ideas: setting up of front organizations. Wherever Communists are in a minority, they try to form with other groups in some common cause—civil rights or social security or peace—and then gradually take over leadership of the whole movement. This unites a large number of people into a pressure group which the Party can command, and

makes contact with new non-Communists who can learn more about the Party and perhaps come to sympathize with its aims.

The Soviet is now developing a new kind of policy which is perhaps most dangerous of all. It is *economic warfare:* an effort to take foreign customers and suppliers away from Western countries and bind them to the Soviet in trade. Their new line of propaganda claims that the 1958 recession in America is the beginning of a major collapse in the West—and that doing business with the Soviet is the best insurance for the future. And to encourage such business, the Soviet is doing on a huge scale what no democratic government—responsible to its own people—could do. It is buying up surplus materials in various countries, especially in South America, whether it needs them or not, is paying whatever price for them will create good-will in the country concerned, and then is "dumping" them on the world market at prices that help create economic trouble for other countries.

Negotiating Wisely

It is with this type of empire that we will be negotiating in the war of words of the future. And we cannot learn about the problems involved if we just think about day-by-day events, about the latest Soviet note or our own reply. Nor can we take our experience in negotiating with non-Communist countries—countries with whom we share common political and economic ideas—and apply it to the USSR. Nor can we just have the simple faith that something good always happens when people sit down and talk together.

We cannot get the feel of how Communists negotiate unless we remember that *they do not expect peace—or even a lowering of tensions—to result from conferences.* In 1920, Lenin was discussing plans for granting certain "concessions" to capitalist countries and indicated that these meant "the continuation of war in another form, by other means . . . It would be a great mistake to believe that a peaceful agreement about concessions is a peaceful agreement with capitalists. It is an agreement concerning war."

This, then, is the chief fact to pin down in our minds: Communists, in negotiating, seek to maneuver themselves into the best position for continuing war. Their approach to negotiations, which seems baffling at first, becomes clear as soon as we realize this fact, as soon as we realize that they are seeking, in Lenin's phrase, "an agreement concerning war."

First, it explains the *breakdown of communication* at conferences. The Communists have come to the council table ideologically set against a meeting of minds. They have come to learn what they can from the enemy, and to get what they can in the way of favorable agreements. They do not want to be influenced. Lenin understood the danger of outside influence on Communist thought. He made it clear, "For Party people, an agreement is an effort to enlist others for the purpose of carrying out Party policy." No Bolshevik, he said, must ever join with a non-Bolshevik in the "free framing" of a policy; for "we have Party decisions on all the important questions of tactics, and we shall never recede from these decisions."

So we can see why Soviet delegates set their policy in isolation and present it in rigid fashion. For them to *share* their thoughts would be to fraternize with the enemy in the midst of war—and to risk coming under his influence.

Secondly, it explains the *constant stalling of procedures.* This is a tactic with a purpose. Admiral C. Turner Joy, during long months of negotiating a Korean armistice, said that by such delay, Communists "hope to exploit . . . the characteristic impatience of Western peoples, impatience to complete a task . . . This is a shrewd analysis, particularly as it applies to Americans. We are a people who like to get things done."

Thirdly, it explains the fact that the USSR has set a world record for *breaking pacts.* No shaper of Communist theory from Marx on ever believed that a promise should be kept any longer than convenient. The Soviet empire rests on broken promises. In 1932, for example, the USSR signed non-aggression pacts with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; in 1934 these were extended for ten years. In 1940, all three countries were invaded. The satellite empire is a monument to Soviet disregard of the Yalta agreement. The Soviet, since 1917, has entered into hundreds of agreements and kept almost none of them.

Why, then, negotiate at all? There are many reasons. Chief among them are that negotiations educate the world to the true nature of Communism; that limited agreements on disarmament can be made to the benefit of everyone; and that time—which is on the side of freedom rather than dictatorship—is gained by negotiating.

But perhaps the best reason was given by Warren Austin, when he was head of our delegation to the United Nations. One angry man complained to him that all they ever did in the UN was talk. Mr. Austin replied, "Would you rather we were shooting each other?"

Communism At Home

So much for what Communism's theories can do for the Soviet abroad. As we have seen, it can create a tightly disciplined, effective Party, provide an

excuse for campaigns of "peace" and "liberation," and make negotiations difficult for the West.

But what about Marx's theories as a basis for Soviet society at home? They have been in operation now for more than four decades. How well have they worked?

In matters of material production, the Communists have written a success story. Sputniks, missiles, atomic power plants, heavy machinery—the appearance of these has meant that Communism has produced results. But there are problems that material production—more weapons, more electricity, more homes—*cannot solve.* And it is here that the Soviet's failure has been most obvious.

The fact is that Khrushchev's troubles, like Lenin's before him, stem from the fact that *nature made man complicated long before Marx's theories made him simple.* For example, it was the stubborn, complicated demond of human beings for freedom which led to the 1953 strikes in East Germany and the 1956 revolt in Hungary. Khrushchev can point with pride to sputniks in the sky but he has to keep an iron clamp on the stubborn, complicated demands of his own people for free discussion of ideas or the free right to change jobs at will.

He cannot permit people to question the truth of Marx's theories, nor keep them from wondering about it. He cannot admit that workers have no ownership rights in the system they "theoretically" own. He must keep them in line with rigid control of trade unions, programs of forced labor, issuance of workbooks which practically chain a man to his job, and the use of secret police inside labor's ranks.

The result of all this is clear: the Soviet is a new class society. Its classes are those who decide what prices, wages, bonuses and rewards are to be paid to the workers, and those who work and obey without question.

Recently Milovan Djilas, for a long time a Party leader in Yugoslavia, but now in prison for speaking his mind, wrote of this new class of Party bureaucrats: "This is a class whose power over men is the most complete known in history . . . When the new class leaves the historical scene—and this must happen—there will be less sorrow over its passing than there has been for any other class before it." His book is rightly titled, "The New Class."

Not only has Marxism made life difficult for the rank-and-file worker, but it has made trouble with plant and office executives. Because these men are trained to run big enterprises, they want to do so with the greatest possible efficiency. It is natural that they would get a good deal of satisfaction from managing their companies well. But the *political* leaders have come to be suspicious of these men who want to run their companies with a free hand. If they give these men real power, it would mean giving up some of their central control of the entire economy. That would be a crack, a first crack, in the brittle wall of dictatorship. And of course where cracks will go, once started, is hard to predict.

This all proves the old truth—that human nature is the toughest problem in the world to solve. Communist leaders have found this to be stubbornly true in their own country. But what they do not realize is that the more elastic a society is, the better it can handle the pressures that men and women bring to bear on it. Democracies, with a free and elastic set of rules, can usually fit people in without too much grumbling. But no dictatorship has this kind of "give."

Our Own Values

Sidney Hook, a teacher of philosophy, once remarked of a democracy in a time of cold war, "Once it is informed, its voluntary discipline can accomplish more than columns that are dragooned into goosesteps. It is tougher in crisis than its totalitarian enemies."

It is tougher in crisis—*if it is aware that a crisis exists.* But before our "voluntary discipline" can support the cause, we must know the nature of Communism well enough to see why we must not let it control the future. That means we must also understand what elements of our way of life we wish to preserve.

Law is one element, for where there is no law, the people perish. The choice of May 1, 1958 as the first Law Day, U.S.A. by President Eisenhower was a fine choice. For while Khrushchev, on this Communist holiday, proclaimed in Moscow that the growing power of Communism was the world's best safeguard against the "war aims" of England and America, Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School spoke a different language. He said, "The law is the highest inheritance the sovereign people has, for without law there would be no sovereign people and no inheritance."

A second element of our life is *respect for the individual.* If you read many Communist books, magazines and pamphlets you realize that nowhere in all the words do you meet the *individual.* Instead, you read about the masses, the proletariat, imperialists, agents of Wall Street and, of course, the Party.

It is no accident that the living, breathing human beig is absent from these writings. Communism is interested in him only as a member of a larger class.

In contrast to this, we believe that the individual has rights which can never be taken away. We believe our government takes its powers from the consent of every individual and that our society is richer

for being made up of different and unique human beings.

A third element in our civilization is our right to feel *friendship and goodwill* toward others. Communism, by contrast, lives in an atmosphere of hatred for all who do not agree with it.

Bella V. Dodd, who joined the Party while she was a teacher and who worked in it for several years, has since said that she did not feel she really belonged until she had made the Party's hates her hates. "Little by little," she writes "I had acquired a whole mass of people to hate: the groups and individuals who fought the Party . . . The Party claims such sovereignty even over conscience as to dictate when it shall hate."

We might say that we are defending against Communism our right to like people and wish them well, without asking permission from our government. We are protecting our right to feel affection and mercy as they occur.

The fourth element in our life is our *right to learn.* Since the sputniks went up, many people have claimed that the Communists are ahead of us in education. It does not belittle their many accomplishments to say that this is not true. Their successes have been in fields that help make people surrender to Communist ideas or that enable a few superior people to serve the State. *We* are in the process of educating a whole people in the ways of democratic freedom.

For instance, Lenin started his huge program to teach people to read and write in order to make it possible to teach them Communist theory. The very books used for teaching contained Communist doctrines as text. In recent years, the Soviet has forged ahead in teaching foreign languages, but again the purpose has been strategic—they need more people to carry the Party line into other countries. And the young people now learning mathematics and science are not free seekers of truth in the world's scientific community. They are servants of the State.

In this country we *do* need to be concerned about the quality of our educational system. But we cannot let the Soviet be our guiding spirit. That must be found in our own ideas of men and liberty. We do not want the child or scientist to think of himself as an obedient servant of the State. We want learning to add to freedom and help us cope with new problems and questions as they arise.

Problems of the Future

Perhaps the greatest difficulty for Americans now is psychological. It is hard for us to learn to live with the cold war—with a "war outlook" and a "peace outlook" at the same time.

It means we have to go ahead with our normal business of living and improving our own country, and also have to meet the zig-zag tactics of a powerful opponent for whom "peace" is just a non-shooting phase of the "permanent revolution." We have never faced a problem like this before and it is not surprising that we have been caught off-guard:

We have been *unbelieving.* We have found it impossible to believe that anyone would want war to go on and on, or would actually think it had to go all the way to world revolution.

We have been *hesitating.* Caught between their peace-loving words and war-like policies, we have not known which is true.

We have felt *guilty.* Much more than we realize, we have let the Communists distort our image of ourselves. They have called us warmongers and imperialists until we almost believe it is true. They have called attention to every unsolved problem of our society until we have forgotten our real accomplishments.

But it is time to set the record straight.

It is the Communists, not we, who have insisted the world is divided into two opposing halves. It is they, not we, who have broken countless treaties and agreements signed by us in good faith. And above all, it is *their* view of history that keeps the "permanent revolution" going.

A doctrine which divides man from man cannot be permitted to make further gains. But only increased understanding of this puzzling power can give us the means to cope with it. It is our responsibility now. The work of keeping the future open for the further unity and freedom of all people rests squarely on our own shoulders. •



BOMB THREATS in INDUSTRIAL PLANTS



Planting a bomb

By DEPUTY INSPECTOR JOHN A. RONAYNE

Bureau of Technical Services, New York City Police Department

• The Bomb Squad of the New York City Police Department is a unit of the Bureau of Technical Services, a subdivision of the Detective Division. Deputy Inspector Ronayne is the Commanding Officer of the Bureau of Technical Services, which in addition to the Bomb Squad is comprised of the Police Laboratory, Ballistics Squad, Bureau of Criminal Identification, Photographic Unit and Correspondence Bureau.

Deputy Inspector Ronayne is a graduate of Fordham University '37 with a B.S. Degree; Fordham Law School '48 with an L.L.B.; admitted to the Bar in the State of New York in the same year; received a Master's Degree in Public Administration at New York University '57; and is presently attending the New York University Graduate School of Law for a L.L.M. with a specialization in Labor Law. He is a graduate of the F.B.I. National Academy and the Security Operations and Methods Course at the New York City Police Academy. He has served in the Patrol and Detective Divisions of the Police Department and in legal and administrative duties in the Legal Bureau and the License Division.

The Bomb Squad was first formed in 1914 to combat anarchy and sabotage arising out of the first World War. The Bomb Squad of the City of New York is perhaps the oldest and most active organization of its type in American police history. The experience that this Squad has gained during the intervening years has never been more needed than in our own day, when the average law enforcement agency, faced by a problem of bombings on a scale never previously encountered, must look to others for aid. Little, if any, of this information can be found in books. Perhaps this is for the best. In this field, experience is the best teacher. •

• For a half century or more, the bomb or infernal device has been a favorite weapon of underground and terrorist groups. In Czarist Russia, in Ireland, and more recently in the Middle East, the bomb has been employed to effect a tremendous toll of lives. The history of our own United States is replete with instances in which bombs were used as instruments of destruction. From and before that day in 1920 when a horse drawn vehicle exploded in the heart of Manhattan's financial district killing 37 and wounding 115, to our own day, when an elevated station in Boston was demolished by an explosion of a suspicious nature, the bomb has been a commonplace tool of criminal activity.

Those of us who lack occasion to reflect on statistics so grim in nature are likely to approach the problem of dealing with the report of a bomb in an industrial plant in a casually skeptical manner, but the unpleasant truth of the matter is that death and injury from bombings have been conspicuously present in our criminal history.

This fact is presently illustrated by recent developments in various parts of the country, in which a growing social unrest has manifested itself in the form of numercus bombings of schools and religious institutions.

For a period from January 1, 1957, through the first three months of 1959, 108 bombings having a racial or religious aspect were reported. This figure is only a part of the total number of such incidents, some of which have involved business establishments. It seems evident that we have entered a cycle in which the possibility of encountering a real, live bomb is steadily increasing.

Of further importance to those of us charged with law enforcement and plant protection is the fact that there is a direct proportion between the incidence of actual bombings and the number of reports of bombs which upon investigation prove to be unfounded. Each bombing seems to engender a rash of false alarms throughout the entire country.

When a synagogue was bombed in Atlanta last year, bomb scare statistics soared in New York City. Thus it is apparent that the ratio of the scare to the real thing is high. Although no reliable statistics on false bomb reports are available on a nationwide basis, the true count must be indeed impressive. Moreover, no facet of American life, religious, racial, educational or economic, seems immune from this ever growing nuisance.

Another factor tending to increase the number of such reports in business organizations and industrial plants is the ease with which the bomb scare may be employed to effect costly disruptions of normal operations. A ten-cent telephone call may halt production for hours. For the person or group who desires to harass management, it is truly a wise investment, since from the standpoint of detection, it has the added virtue of being almost foolproof.

Importance of Planning

The necessity of advance planning for action to be taken when a report of a bomb in an industrial plant is received cannot be over-emphasized. Certain key personnel, such as the possible recipients of the bomb threat or warning, must be thoroughly instructed in advance. Action on receiving the warning must be almost automatic; the plan should be set in operation the instant the original threat is received, since the initiative lies with the perpetrator and not with the plant protection officials. To delay decision on a plan of action until such an incident actually arises will result in hesitation, confusion and loss of production, not to mention property damage and personal injury, should an explosion actually occur. No amount of planning, however prudent, will eliminate all these hazards, but intelligent preparation can do much to diminish those not inherent in the particular circumstances.

Since the motive underlying most of these incidents is to cause annoyance and excitement, lack of foresight aids the perpetrator in his aims and lead on in a vicious circle to further incidents and further inconvenience.

The greatest difficulty in designing measures to cope with this problem is to protect persons and property while at the same time to maintain production and avoid loss of man hours. In any planning the protection of life and property must take precedence. However, provisions consistent with both objectives are possible and can be realized by a knowledge of the nature of bomb threats intelligently applied to the individual circumstances of plant operation.

The policy underlying planning of this kind requires decision making at a high managerial level and cannot be decided by the security officer alone. A clear statement of policy must be made in advance for the guidance of supervisory personnel and the plant protection forces.

Origin of Bomb Reports

Planning should logically begin with an examination of the manner in which these reports, threats, or warnings arise and of the motives of the persons who originate them.

Two general patterns of origin are evident:

a. In the first, the bomb is purely fictitious and the person initiating the report is aware of this fact and remains anonymous. In an industrial plant his motive is likely to be materialistic, that is, he seeks to achieve a real personal or social gain by using this false report to harass or intimidate. Examples of this would be a personal grievance against management or a labor dispute. The success of the report, as viewed by the perpetrator, is measured in terms of work stoppage and costly countermeasures. This should suggest to the security planner the course to be followed: a discreet, efficient procedure embodying minimum interference with normal operations. The same principle holds true where the perpetrator has a psychopathic desire to create excitement. Gross evidence of managerial discomfort and extravagant precautions lead only to the previously described vicious circle of further false reports.

b. In the second pattern of origin, the person initiating the notification has, what seems to him, a good reason for believing that a bomb may be actually present. This person, usually but not always, will identify himself and be available to assist in the investigation. Examples of this are the discovery of a suspicious object by a plant guard, a bomb threat overheard in a place of public assembly or, in general, any information received from a usually reliable source. When this type of report offers specific details for verification or disproval, investigation rather than general search may be indicated. The most important feature of such a notification is that it may be true.

Evaluation of Reports of Bombs

There are some who profess to see a quick and simple solution to the problem here in the origin of the report. These would place their faith in the worthlessness of the anonymous warning, ignoring subsequent precautions or rendering them lip service only by performing them in perfunctory fashion or by devising separate procedures. This general tendency to discount or to minimize the anonymous warning is contrary to a fundamental principle of investigation. The anonymous tip is often the most valuable. Police records substantiate the application of this axiom to reports of bombs. New York's in-

(Continued on page 18)

The Answer to Security Training



By E. V. ELKINS and J. A. REEDER

. . . . *"We'd like to send a man to the school at Baltimore but, frankly, with conditions as they are, we can't afford to lose the man for a week."*

. . . . *"We don't do enough business to warrant hiring a security specialist but, we would like to handle this thing properly."*

. . . . *"We know all these measures are probably very necessary but, we don't have trained experts on this security business."*

• A year ago all these "buts" would have been valid statements in attempting to excuse the use of uninformed security personnel in industrial plants in the Philadelphia area. BUT . . . and we use the word proudly, Philadelphia has an answer to these problems in the form of a training course presented by the Management Institute of Temple University. This course, labelled "Industrial Security and Plant Protection" represents a cooperative effort between officials of the Management Institute and representatives of the Army, Navy and Air Force in the Philadelphia area.

True, the government presents some courses at various schools, but each is a specialized course and limited in clientele. For example, the Provost Marshal General of the Army conducts a course covering the physical security of installations and industrial plants, available only to Department of Defense personnel and some selected industrial representatives; the Army Intelligence Center presents courses in the Safeguarding of Classified Information, which many of us have attended; and police agencies can avail themselves of the training courses given by their academies and the FBI. Industry, unless it is in the selective group of contractors working on classified projects—and can spare the manpower—or has a mobilization mission for the Department of Defense, has had little opportunity to avail itself of specialized training in the important field of "Industrial Security."

Representatives of Temple University and Philadelphia Department of Defense activities discuss expansion of the Industrial Security & Plant Protection Course to be offered by the Management Institute during the Fall Semester. (l to r): J. A. Reeder, Army; W. J. Stevenson, Air Force; H. A. Stackman, Director, Management Institute; E. L. Gerding, Course Coordinator, Management Institute; Maj. Gen. (ret.) B. L. Milburn, Special Programs Director, Management Institute; and E. V. Elkins, Navy.



Yet how do we serve the smaller facilities who have and are aware of the need, but whose security personnel cannot be spared for several days of continuous training because of other equally important collateral duties? And how do we reach those persons who want to broaden their knowledge of the various aspects of these programs even if only for purposes of self-development, to qualify for promotional opportunities, to acquire training without incurring loss of working time, or perhaps purely for refresher and reorientation? Should we continue to ignore these participants and potential contributions to the security program merely because of lack of time or opportunity? Wouldn't we correspondingly reduce the hazards to personnel, property, and classified information by affording these people also an economical and convenient means of obtaining the requisite knowledge?

Seeking the answer to this problem, Major General (Ret.) Bryan L. Milburn, Director of Special Programs at the Management Institute of Temple University, early in 1957 discussed the idea of a special course for industry with a former security officer of a large electronics company. They found that a course of this type was not only badly needed, but would be a "first" in the Eastern United States. After due deliberation, a contact was made with Jim Reeder, the Chief of the Second U. S. Army's Industrial Security Field Office in Philadelphia. This contact confirmed the desirability for a course

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covering all phases of Industrial Security, including Disaster Planning. Ervin Gerding, former Security Officer of Leeds and Northrup Company accepted the job as coordinator for the course and immediately undertook the task of putting it together.

With Gene Elkins, Industrial Security Administrator of the Office of Supervising Inspector of Naval Material, Southeastern District; Bill Stevenson, Chief of the Industrial Security Division, Philadelphia Air Procurement District; and the aforementioned Jim Reeder serving as advisors, Mr. Gerding was able to develop a curriculum which would provide the most current doctrine in all the related fields. In January 1959 the course was finalized and instructors in the various phases selected from military agencies and private industry. With only a minimum of publicity, twenty-seven students enrolled. They represented a cross section of government specialists, industry security personnel, investigative agency representatives, guards, and management personnel of various companies. Security experience in this group ranged from none to more than thirty years.

For twelve weeks—from February through May —the group met with the instructors for more than two hours on one night each week and applied themselves to a concentrated volume of training. Subjects ranged from the problems and hazards facing industry from espionage, sabotage, vandalism, pilferage, theft, subversive activity, etc., to the normal hazards of nature. Wartime conditions and hazards were presented by the Training Officer of the Pennsylvania State Civil Defense Council. Even the related fields of these subjects were covered by experts in Safety, Industrial Hygiene, Fire Prevention and Guard Forces. Major Andrew J. Kukucka of the Army Intelligence Center made a most interesting presentation of the organization of the Communist espionage apparatus and its *modus operandi*. Government respresentatives clarified the requirements of Department of Defense regulations for the protection of classified information, explaining not only WHAT must be done but the important WHY behind each requirement, with practical demonstrations of HOW, in some instances.

All instructions, conferences and films led to a final written examination. Genuine interest and enthusiasm were displayed by this pioneer group of students and grades were high. Appropriate certificates were issued by Temple University to all students meeting academic requirements for satisfactory completion. Now these students are in a position to provide, in addition to their experience, evidence of concentrated and comprehensive study of the security program at an accredited educational institution.

From student comments and inquiries received, Temple University recognizes that a basic need of their industrial community is being met. Plans are now in progress to expand the present curriculum for the Fall semester and possibly other forms of presentation will be considered next year.

If more colleges and universities present courses in these fields, it will not be long before the Security Officer, Security Director (or what title have you) takes his rightful place as a professional in a specialized field along with other recognized professions. This is true, because in most instances industrial management has already accepted the need for professional guidance in the field of Plant Protection and Industrial Security, and has accorded due recognition to the importance of professional security personnel in the efficiency of overall operations.

Moreover, as evidenced by a recent Department of Defense security poster originally designed by a contractor, responsible management is now convinced that there can be no priority between production and security—that neither is the chicken or the egg—that they must go hand in hand to accomplish their individual and respective purposes. No matter how ingenious, a classified project may be useless if it is finished far ahead of schedule, but at the sacrifice of security because of the emphasis on production. Remember those supposedly secret fire control mechanisms in that old security film "You Never Can Tell"? The enemy had instituted very effective countermeasures before we even had a chance to use this very special new equipment. Likewise, vast sums of money can easily be wasted in domestic product research unless proper security is maintained to ensure retention of a competitive advantage when the item is first put on the market. And we can be certain that the security staff will be expected to ensure a profit on these investments by keeping a tight lid on the secret products until that lid is ready to be lifted.

Management also is gradually recognizing the economic and business advantages of significantly reducing excessive personnel turnover, pilferage, and unnecessary interruption to production, all of which are gained through the application of such factors as pre-employment screening, effective use of guards, visitor control measures, and the knowledge of conditions which influence employee attitudes and morale. The security group will be depended upon, to an ever increasing degree, to insure that efforts along these lines produce the desired results. New developments, particularly in the field of electronic intrusion detection devices, screening systems for employees, and ever changing security requirements by the government, place more and more demands

The CASE of the "GHOST GANG" ROBBERIES

NEEDING ADDITIONAL WAREHOUSE SPACE, A LARGE EASTERN ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURING COMPANY LEASED FACILITIES NEAR ITS MAIN PLANT. IN SPITE OF PERIODIC CHECKS, VALUABLE EQUIPMENT DISAPPEARED REGULARLY FROM STORAGE AREAS AND LOADING DOCKS.



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on the Security Officer for greater knowledge of his chosen specialty. He must truly be a professional to keep pace with his colleagues in the Philadelphia area.

We in the security field have long decried the fact that our work was often categorized with that of a dog catcher, or compared with the cop on the beat by the more generous minded people. Those who have been in this business for any appreciable period of time know that nothing could be farther from the truth. The success of a security program depends as much on your ability to sell it to your superiors and colleagues as it does on the existence of regulations and procedures. To convince others of the mutual benefits of the program, to gain from it its maximum value, demands dedicated people equipped with resourcefulness, perseverance, patience and security education.

It is through courses like Temple University's that security education can be made available. You are urged to explore the possibility of similar courses being prepared and presented in your area by colleges and universities. REMEMBER . . . the mark of the professional security man is not just his title, but how well he knows and applies his knowledge to the matter at hand. Courses such as the one described will help us to gain professional recognition and at the same time furnish this essential and most important tool—KNOWLEDGE. •

—o—

FIRE DOORS AND WINDOWS
National Fire Protection Association

• A new standard for the installation of fire doors and windows has been published by the National Fire Protection Association.

The standard, NFPA No. 80, is the result of more than three years of development work by the NFPA Committee on Fire Doors and Windows, a representative group under the chairmanship of W. K. Estep of the Middle Department Association of Fire Underwriters, Pittsburgh, Pa. It was adopted at the National Fire Protection Association's recent annual meeting.

The text, which is a complete revision of the previous standard on this subject, classifies doors and windows in terms of hours of resistance to standard test fires. It is expected it will be widely used in building codes as well as an advisory guide to good practice.

The pamphlet is fully illustrated with drawings showing standard methods of installation of fire doors, hardware, automatic closing devices and other details.

Copies (NFPA No. 80, 72 pages, 75¢ per copy) are available from the National Fire Protection Association, 60 Batterymarch Street, Boston 10, Mass. •

—o—

LP-GAS FIRE CONTROL
National Fire Protection Association

• An important new addition to film libraries is now available through the National Fire Protection Association. "LP-Gas Fire Control" is of special value to public and industrial fire departments and fire training schools as well as to the gas industry in general.

The 10-minute 16 mm color with sound film is an on-the-scene report of an outstanding job of fighting an LP-Gas tank truck fire. The Arcade, California Fire Department under Chief George W. Requa preplanned for gas fire emergencies. The emergency struck one night when a truck-trailer combination carrying 8,000 gallons of liquified petroleum gas was involved in fire.

The department was well-prepared not only to fight the fire but to record the action in detail on film.

Along with a clear, instructional commentary, the film shows what the department did, how its tactics worked out and other important elements of fire ground action. A spectacular sequence shows how relief valves function and how hose streams were used to get control of a tough situation.

Arrangements to make prints available have been made through NFPA's Gases Field Service. The film is a valuable and permanent addition to any fire film library.

Orders for it, at $75 per print, may be sent to National Fire Protection Association, 60 Batterymarch Street, Boston 10, Mass. •

—o—

Bomb Threats in Industrial Plants

(Continued from page 12)

famous "Mad Bomber," frequently notified the police or press of the locations of bombs he had concealed. There are numerous other instances in which anonymous bomb threats or warnings were followed by malicious explosions resulting in the death or maiming of innocent persons. A further consideration is the added responsibility with which a previous notice burdens the recipient. To be warned beforehand and fail to take adequate measures exposes the recipient to a charge of negligence should injury to others ensue.

Therefore, while the identity or non-identity of the originator of the message is important for in-

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vestigative purposes, this fact alone cannot be construed as a measure of the validity of the threat. Security procedures must be predicated on the assumption that all such warnings are true, until proven otherwise.

THE MESSAGE

Other than in the case of discovery of a suspicious object, reports of bombs originate by means of oral or written threats or warnings. Security personnel and local police must be immediately advised of receipt of any type of warning. The most common form of oral threat is the anonymous telephone call to a plant employee. Occasionally the call is made directly to local authorities. The need for the previous instruction of employees likely to receive such messages is obvious here.

The following points merit special consideration:

WORDING: Care should be taken to record the exact wording of the original message, with particular emphasis as to the time and location of the alleged bomb or explosion. Knowledge of the time and location will eliminate much needless activity. If the message is to be believed at all it must be believed in its entirety and not merely in part. Nothing should be deleted from the message either for the convenience of management or to expedite a plan of action. The caller will tend to use the same wording in other messages. Writing down or recording the exact words will enable investigators to differentiate between the threat of a real bomber and the crank call generated by publicity. The repeated use of the same phrases and words in anonymous notes led to the identification of George Metesky, the so-called "Mad Bomber" in New York City, by comparison with letters written years before to the management of the Edison Company, to which he had signed his name.

An attempt should be made to engage the caller in further conversation for the purpose of making him reveal vital details of the threat or possibly some clue to his identity. A special effort of this nature should be made when the time and place are not specified. This can be accomplished by pretending not to understand and asking the caller to repeat his message. Occasionally telephone calls may be traced, but in the era of the dial telephone, such success is rare.

VOICE: Vocal characteristics, also, should be observed. These include noting whether the voice is that of a male or female, adolescent or adult, and marking any unusual characteristics, such as peculiar pronunciations of certain words or syllables, or an accent, either foreign or that of a particular American locality. Anxiety, laughter, or detectable emotional state should be noted in the voice. Accompanying background noises will sometimes indicate whether the call is being made in a tavern, subway station, or other public place.

Written threats take the form of letters, postcards or notes left on the premises. Personnel receiving them should be instructed in the following precautions:

To preserve possible fingerprints and avoid smudging, the missive should not be handled unnecessarily. Clip boards and glassine envelopes are useful for this purpose. Fingerprints, handwriting and typewriting identification and comparison are possible investigative measures and immediate steps should be taken by the security officer to preserve this evidence. Further investigation may require providing police with specimens of writing from suspect machines and persons.

Bombs and Suspicious Objects and Packages

Most reports of bombs involve a physical search of the affected premises. Plant personnel must be told what they are searching for. What does a bomb look like? What is a suspicious object or package? It may seem to be of little help to say that bombs may be as small as a fountain pen or as large as a trailer truck; solid or liquid in form; disguised in any manner, concealed by any means. Yet this is the unfortunate truth. A bomb or infernal device, as it is sometimes called, is limited in its form only by the ingenuity of its maker. Electric appliances, lunch boxes, suitcases, and a variety of common household items have been used in the past to conceal bombs.

During World War Two a worker in a defense plant carried components of a bomb into the plant piece by piece and then assembled the bomb on the premises. The bomb was contained in a lunch box and was composed of four sticks of dynamite, an electric detonater, a dry cell battery and a timing mechanism from an alarm clock. The bomb was never set off and upon discovery the young man stated that he was attempting to show an inadequacy of the plant's security system.

Bombs may be carried into a premises, delivered

by mail, or shipped via a package or crate through the regular receiving processes of the plant. Obviously defense against the planting of a bomb in an industrial type of operation is not simple. How then can the security officer instruct his search force? Some knowledge of bombs may be of help.

Bombs may be classified into two categories, the manual and the time. The former is the anti-disturbance or the "victim-actuated" type designed to explode upon some normal action of the finder, such as opening the wrapping of a package. Some bombs of this type are triggered by the slightest movement. Our suggestion then—never attempt to move or to open a suspected bomb. In Easton, Pennsylvania, Charles Weaver, an explosive expert of long standing, was killed when he attempted to open a package he had good reason to believe was a bomb. Two clerks had been killed a few days before by a similar package, in the course of their normal working procedure.

The time bomb is, as the name implies, designed to explode at a predetermined time. It usually, but not necessarily, includes a watch or clock, and a source of electricity, such as a battery. This type is almost as dangerous to handle as the manual type, since an ill-conceived attempt to open it, may result in an electrical short and a premature explosion. Time bombs may also be of the chemical type, where two chemicals are separated by a time delay device. The bomb also may be either an explosive or an incendiary type. It is always wise to anticipate the possibility that a suspicious package may be incendiary in nature and have fire fighting equipment standing by.

Although it may be possible for an expert to neutralize a bomb by removing the time delay mechanism or detaching the detonator, this is seldom possible at the scene of a bomb scare. The various elements of the bomb are disguised and concealed. The package has usually been made up to disguise its contents and the device designed to defeat efforts to neutralize or disassemble. Attempts to disassemble a bomb are not recommended under any circumstances.

The open dynamite bomb is popular in many sections of the country, because its components may be easily obtained by theft from construction jobs or by purchase under an assumed name. This type has been used frequently in racial bombings and in labor strife.

If the bomb is identifiable as an open type dynamite bomb, that is several sticks of dynamite tied together with a blasting cap inserted directly into a stick and ending in a fuse, the action to be taken depends upon the condition of the fuse. If the fuse is burning, the safest action is to vacate the area im-

mediately. Attempts to cut off a burning fuse can lead to disaster, since the point to which the fuse has burned internally is substantially in advance of the outwardly visible burning. In general, a fuse or blasting cap should not be yanked out of the dynamite stick. If the cap is an electric type and is attached to wires, these wires may be removed from the source of power or cut separately to prevent an electric charge from setting off an explosion.

Precautions

All types of bombs are dangerous. They may be set off in a great number of ways. The silent mercury type switch which can be bought in almost any store can without requiring exceptional skill be installed in a "lunch box bomb" so that the least movement in any direction will set off the explosion.

A chemical bomb can also be constructed in a variety of ways so that any normal action with relation to the package will bring the two chemicals together with a resultant explosion. Tilting the package, moving it or unscrewing a cover may set off the explosive device.

To distinguish the manual from the time bomb is the art of the expert. For our purposes, however, the history of the suspicious object or package may be helpful. A package delivered by mail, for example, permits possible movement, if necessary to get it out of a vital area.

What makes an object or package suspicious? The answer may be any one or a combination of the following:

A. The object fits the circumstances described in the threat or warning.

B. The object is foreign to the premises.

C. The origin of the object is questionable or cannot be readily determined.

D. The object is labeled "Bomb," "Danger," etc.

E. The physical appearance of the object is suspicious, in regard to size, shape, weight or audibility.

Plan of Action

Any plan of action for a particular plant must be formulated with the sanction of local public safety officials because laws and policy vary geographically. Planning should provide for the training and use of the security forces and the housekeeping forces as the persons most likely to discover the suspicious package. The plan should also include the use of the fire brigade or industrial civil

defense unit of the plant after the suspicious package is located.

This procedure should be flexible to provide for changing circumstances, yet specific enough to furnish each employee concerned with a definite guide.

Some of the components of such a plan have been previously discussed. The importance of obtaining the exact time and location was stressed. Now this information can be applied and may greatly simplify the problem. If a comparatively small area of the plant and a definite time were named, then this area plus an additional 300 feet in any direction can be evacuated for a reasonable interval before and after the designated time. This will permit a thorough search by the security officer, his aides and the police, with minimum inconvenience to management.

If the original message does not specify the time and location, or the area designated is large, then a more general procedure must be utilized. This plan would separate the plant into natural divisions and sub-divisions, such as floors and departments.

The person ordinarily in charge of each division should be responsible for the search of his particular area. Where these areas are extensive this person would perhaps be the head of a search team.

The plan should be initiated by a confidential signal or transmitted in code over the public address system. In most cases only these key personnel would be alerted and would be aware of the incident at this particular time. Each would make a discreet search of his respective area for a suspicious object or package and report his findings by telephone to a search headquarters established in the security office.

At the security office these reports would be recorded on a check list of plant areas. If upon completion of reports from all areas no suspicious object is found then management should confer with local police officials and determine a further course of action.

If, however, an area reports a suspicious object then under no circumstances should it be touched or moved except by experts. All personnel within a radius of 300 feet of a suspicious object should be evacuated immediately. The area should be ventilated by opening windows and doors to help disperse the force of a potential explosion. Firefighting equipment should be mobilized and ready for instant use.

Examination and/or removal of such objects is a police problem and should be accomplished only by experts. However, outside of a handful of police departments who maintain special squads or have trained individual members for this purpose, true experts in the field of infernal devices are rare indeed. But most law enforcement agencies today are becom-

ing more and more conscious of the need to cope with a problem of this kind and have taken some positive measures to remedy this defect.

However, if your plant is in an isolated area and the police are not able to help you, you should try to locate and obtain the services of an explosives expert in advance. You may have such skills among your own employees. However, even an expert in industrial explosives is not to be considered a bomb expert. He must have additional training in igniters, timing devices and booby traps. Some of your employees may have military experience in ordnance and demolition work. This, combined with a knowledge of explosives, is only the starting point in training as a bomb expert. Our Bomb Squad has the advantage of having portable X-ray and other special equipment to assist them in examining the suspicious package. Very few industrial plants will have such equipment available.

The foregoing suggestions are the product of many years of experience of the New York City Police Department Bomb Squad. They offer general principles and specific recommendations which have been successfully adopted by many large organizations to their own individual needs. When used with creative resourcefulness they will work.

SUMMARY

Train your personnel in the action to be taken upon receipt of a bomb threat.

Upon the discovery of a bomb or an object suspected of being a bomb:

(1) Notify the police and the plant security officer.

(2) Evacuate all persons from the area within 300 feet of the suspected bomb.

(3) Notify the local Fire Department and the plant fire brigade.

(4) Close off and guard the area.

(5) Shut off gas, fuel and power lines into the danger area.

(6) Obtain the services of a bomb expert.

While the experienced handler employing all the accepted precautionary methods may minimize the risk of an untoward incident, it must be remembered that bombs and explosives are designed to explode and that there is no absolutely safe method of handling them. The preceding pages have been prepared as an approach to one of the most difficult of all police problems, and it is hoped that they may offer some helpful suggestions with respect to the problem of bomb threats in industrial plants. •

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

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PREMISES ALARM—For doors, windows and other accessible points

TELAPPROACH — For safes and metal cabinets

PHONETALARM — For vaults (sound detection)

ULTRASONIC ALARM — For storage vaults and rooms (not recommended for bank vaults)

FIRE ALARM—Manual and Automatic, Sprinkler Supervisory and Waterflow Alarm

WATCHMAN AND GUARD SUPERVISION

Controlled Companies of

AMERICAN DISTRICT TELEGRAPH COMPANY

A NATIONWIDE ORGANIZATION

Executive Office: 155 Sixth Ave., New York 13, N.Y.

ADT

An ADT protection specialist will be glad to review your requirements, supply complete information. Call our local sales office; or write to our Executive Office.